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THE POLICE POWER AND THE TEN-HOUR BAKERY LAW.
Much antagonism, grading all the way from the philosophic
dissent of Mr. Justice Holmes to the bitter comment of the more
socialistic press, which hint a vague analogy to the Dred Scott deci-
sion, has been aroused by the final disposition of the case of People
vi. Lochner, 25 Sup. Ct. 539, five judges there held that a law, for-
bidding proprietors of bakeries to "require or permit" an employee
to work more than ten hours a day, or sixty hours a week, is merely
an illegal interference with liberty of contract, void under the
fourteenth amendment, and is not a regulation so proximately con-
cerned with public health as to come within the protection of the
police power. Justices Harlan, White, Day and Holmes dissented.
A further illustration of the divergence of opinion which the
question has raised is found in the decision of the New York Court
of Appeals, which upheld the law, four judges approving, as
against three dissenting. Same case, 69 N. E. 374-
Ever since the now classic Slaughter-House Cases, where the
term "police power" perhaps first received a well-defined expres-
sion, it has meant much or little, according to the individual concep-
tion of the judges before whom each case, in which it was involved,
was tried. The personal equation is of no small weight in fixing
its boundaries. Punitive damages laws, game laws, even laws pro-
hibiting the possession of stamped soda-water bottles (People v.
Cannon, 139 N. Y. 32), have been admitted to be proper police
regulations, while, on the other hand, a legislature may not prescribe
the number of hours beyond which women must not be employed in
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dry-goods stores-at least, according to the Illinois court. People
v. Ritchie, 155 II. 98.
In the present case the broad field, which has been open to legis-
latures in the exercise of the power, has been given narrower limits
than formerly. To be sure, the statute here declared unconstitu-
tional went a step further than most laws of the same nature hitherto
declared valid. The ordinary so-called "labor" statutes, which
merely declare how long a legal day shall be, do not prevent agree-
ments for a longer day. United States v. Martin, 94 U. S. 4oo. And
where the occupation for which the day's work is prescribed is
undeniably dangerous and unhealthy, as for instance working under
ground, such laws must be recognized as valid. Holden v. Hardy,
169 U. S. 366. But until the present case it has been recognized
and asserted many times that the courts, while they would adjudge
whether the legislature had used a fair discretion in exercising
the power, nevertheless would refuse to declare a law void "until
they had indulged every possible presumption in favor of the
validity of the statute, and had been wholly unable to find that
it could be sustained as a constitutional exercise of legislative
power." See the opinion in Taylor v. Place, 4 R. I. 324; also,
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 661. Now it appears from the main
opinion in the present case that there existed but a very weak pre-
sumption in favor of the integrity of the New York legislature in
passing the act; in fact the presumption seems tQ have been on the
other side. That is not entirely in accord with former expressions
on the particular point. But when it proceeds to declare the stat-
ute void because of the court's belief concerning the sanitary status
of bakers,-a belief which is certainly not in accordance with the
popular conception, nor even with that expressed in medical and
other technical works on the subject, (as Justice Harlan in the
Supreme Court, and Judges Parker and Vann in the New York
Court of Appeals, forcibly indicated in their respective opinions),-
it seems that the judiciary is approaching a little nearer the legis-
lative border line that it has hitherto. The old writers on the Con-
stitution dreaded such an approach, and the Convention, though
of course with no thought of the fourteenth amendment and its
accompanying police power, rather heartily rejected the proposal
to vest in the judiciary a qualified negative on all legislation, 3
Madison Papers 1332. All this discussion, it cannot be denied, is
in the face of Mr. Justice Peckham's affirmance that "this is not a
question of substituting the judgment of the court for that of the
legislature."
The decision obviously avoids a question of great difficulty
which might arise in future--where, if not here, and with what class
of labor, if not with this, could this infringement on liberty of con-
tract be held invalid? Many kinds of employment have more or
less of that which is unhealthy in them, and there is undoubtedly
a tendency toward legislative restriction of liberty of contract. So
that the practical results of the case will probably be salutary.
Nevertheless, the chiasmus between the opinions of Justice Peck-
ham and Judge Bartlett, disapproving the constitutionality of the
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law, and of Justice Holmes and Judge Parker, upholding it, presents
an interesting comparison of different lines of logic. For this
reason, as well as for the importance of the case, they are worthy
of much study.
REASONABLENESS IN LEGISLATIVE REGULATION OF FARES.
It is well established that where a railroad is deprived by a legis-
lature of the power to charge reasonable rates for the use of its
property, and such deprivation takes place in the absence of an
investigation by judicial machinery, the company is deprived of the
lawful use of its property, and thus, in effect, of the property itself,
without due process of law. Chicago & St. P. R. Co. v. Minn.,
134 U. S. 418, 458. But as to what constitutes reasonableness in
rate regulations, the courts are not wholly clear. In the recent
Massachusetts case of Comm. v. Interstate St. R. Co., 73 N. E. 530,
a statute requiring that street railroads shall carry public school
children at half rates is held valid. The company in this case
offered to show that the average cost of transportation per passen-
ger was more than one-half its regular rates. But the court argues
that the company can make good any loss, by simply raising the
regular. rate of fare. This assumes as an economic truth that rail-
road profits are proportional to rates charged. And it is hard to
reconcile this argument with the court's further statement that if
the law were one which "would cause expense to street railway
corporations, which they must bear themselves or put upon other
classes of passengers in the form of increased fares to make good
the loss," it would be unconstitutional. At all events, the court
bases its judgment as to "reasonableness" on the fact that the
company's business as a whole is not shown to be rendered unprofit-
able.
This holding finds some support in Missouri R. Co. v. Smith,
6o Ark. 221, where it was held that rates imposed are not neces-
sarily unreasonable because they are unrenumerative on a certain
portion of the line. This is true even though the unrenumerative
subdivision was once a separate road. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v.
Gill, 156 U. S. 649. On the other hand, a state cannot justify
unreasonably low rates for domestic transportation, considered
alone, on the ground that the carrier is earning large profits on its
interstate business, over which, so far as rates are concerned, the
state has no control. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 541. And it is
said that a state's regulation of charges is not to be measured by
the aggregate profits, determined by the volume of its business, but
by the question whether any particular charge to an individual is,
considering the service rendered, an unreasonable exaction. The
question is not how much one makes out of his volume of business,
but whether in each transaction the charge is an unreasonable
exaction for the service rendered. Having a right to do business,
one has a right to charge for each separate service that which is a
reasonable compensation therefor, and the legislature may not deny
him such reasonable compensation. Per Mr. Justice Brewer, in
Cotting v. Godard, 183 U. S. 95.
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Since the Massachusetts justices reject the average cost perpassenger as a criterion of reasonableness in charges, it would seem
incumbent upon them to present some rule of mathematics whereby
the points they suggest could be applied in estimating the reason-
ableness of rates. Their reasoning is liable to the criticism made
by another court, where an effort to show that a probable increase
in passengers would make up for a reduction in rate was held to
furnish no reliable basis for decision, being "too speculative an
argument for acceptance." Milwaukee Electric R. Co. v. Mil-
waukee, 87 Fed. 577, 578.
THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES IN CONVERSIONS BY STOCK BROKERS.
The ease with which the English system of common law can be
molded to meet the exigencies of modern business is aptly illustrated
in the evolution of the rule of damages in conversion, where the
subject of the conversion is liable to rapid fluctuation in value, as
is the case with stocks or bonds in the hands of a broker. Out of a
conflict which seemed for the time utterly hopeless, the courts have
gradually produced a rule which is now being rapidly seized upon as
affording a just and safe criterion. This is stated with extreme
lucidity in the twin cases of Federal Stock & Grain Co. v. Wiggins,
77 Conn. 507, and Ling v. Malcom, 77 Conn. 517. Both cases arose
out of an unauthorized conversion of stocks in the hands of a
broker, and the rule was there given as follows: "The correct
measure of the plaintiff's damage was, therefore, the excess, if any,
over the price realized (at the sale on June ioth) of the lowest
sum for which he could have placed the stocks after notice of
the sale, had he given an order to that effect with reasonable
promptness; or, in case of fluctuations of market price between
the wrongful sale and the latest day to which it would have been
reasonable to defer a repurchase, the difference, if any, between the
price obtained when the shares were converted and the highest
market price, in excess thereof, attained during that period."
Three rules for the computation of damages in cases of this
character have been adopted by the various courts. In a few states
it is held that the value of the stock at the time of the conversion
should furnish the standard of measurement. Freeman v. Har-
wvood, 49 .Me. 195; Baltimore Ins. Co. v. Dalrymple, 25 Md. 269;
Brylan v. Huguet, 8 Nev. 345. It is obvious, however, that this
rule leaves the customer at the mercy of his broker, and the rule
has received but limited indorsement.
Thp first rule to be adopted by influential courts was that
damages for the conversion of stock should be computed upon the
basis of the highest price intermediate the conversion and the time
of trial. This rule originated in, and is still followed by, the Eng-
lish courts. Cud v. Rutts, I P. Wins. 572; Harrison v. Harrison,
I C. & P. 412, II E. C. L. 436; Owen v. Routh, 14 C. B. 372.
When cases involving the point arose in the United States the
tendency was to follow the English cases. Romaine v. Allen, 26
N. Y. 309; West v. Pritchard, 19 Conn. 212; but the rule was
found to be inequitable in many cases, as it practically allowed the
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party bringing suit to delay his action, and thus increase in many
instances the amount of his damages. The rule continues, however,
to be followed in a few states. Sturgis v. Keith, 57 Ill. 451;
Parsons v. Martin, ii Gray (Mass.) iI; Neiler v. Kelley, 69 Pa.
St. 403, 408. In the latter state it has been limited to those cases
where a relation of trust exists between the parties, and, where
a transfer of stock was permitted by a bank on a forged power of
attorney, there being no breach of trust, the value at the time of the
conversion was accepted as a criterion. In re Jamison & Co.-s Est.,
163 Pa. St. 143; Ins Co. v. Phila., etc., R. R. Co., 153 Pa. St. i6o.
In some states the English rule has been adopted by statute, but the
courts have required the complainant to proceed without unreason-
able delay, and where this was not done, have estimated upon the
basis of the value at the time of conversion. Fargo First Nat. Bk.
v. Minn. Elevator Co., 8 N. Dak. 43o .
The case of Romaine v. Allen, supra, opened the eyes of the
New York courts to the dangers of the English rule. In that case
the trial was a protracted one before a referee, and the stock, which
was worth $3,937.50 at the time of conversion, rose to $8,175 during
the course of the trial. This was allowed by the referee as
damages. When the subject came again before the Court of Appeals
in Baker v. Drake, 53 N. Y. 211, 217, the decision in Romaine v.
Allen was reversed, and the now prevailing rule adopted. This
was subsequently reaffirmed in Wright v. Bank of Metropolis, 11o
N. Y. 237, and by the Federal Supreme Court in Galigher v. Jones,
129 U. S. 193. The rule in these cases, and as it is more clearly
stated by the Connecticut court, is now adopted by the majority
of the states. Citizens' St. Ry. Co. v. Robbins, 144 Ind. 671;
Dimock v. U. S. Nat. Bk., 55 N. J. L. 296; Ralston v.Bk., 112 Cal.
208. Although severely criticized by Mr. Sedgwick in his work on
Damages, it has the advantage of affording the complainant a just
and equitable relief without either giving him the opportunity to
speculate upon his damages upon one hand, or on the other, of
imposing a harsh and excessive punishment upon the debtor.
Sedgwick, Damages, sec. 5o8, et seq. Where the stock has not
advanced, under the prevailing rule, the complainant can obtain
only nominal damages. Taussig v. Hart, 58 N. Y. 425.
It is interesting to note that the Connecticut court held it neces-
sary to plead as special damage the fact that the stock had risen
in value between the time of conversion and the time when it might
have been replaced, and would not allow proof of that fact to be
admitted under the general claim for damages.
DISCRIMINATION IN THE TAXATION OF STATE AND NATIONAL
BANKS.
The question has several times arisen of what constitutes dis-
crimination in the taxation of state and national banks, under U. S.
Rev. St., Sec. 5219, which exempts all the property of national
banks, not including real estate within the taxing state; but pro-
vides for the taxation of the stock of such banking corporations,
further providing that the stock shall not be taxed at a greater rate
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than other moneyed capital in the hands of the individual citizens
of the state.
It may be laid down as an established rule that the mere fact
that different systems of taxation are applied to state and to national
banks does not of itself constitute discrimination under the statute,
Nevada Nat. Bank v. Dodge, I19 Fed. 57; Davenport Nat. Bank
v. Board of Equalization, 123 U. S. 83. All that the statute
requires is that the national banks be not unjustly discriminated
against; they need not be taxed in the same manner. Davenport
Nat. Bank v. Board of Equalization, supra. It has also been held
that a statute imposing taxes on bank shares and requiring the
assessment of such shares to be made at their market value, without
making any deduction on account of the real estate owned by the
bank, is not discriminative. Peo. Nat. Bank v. Marye, IO7 Fed. 570.
This case further holds that the statutes of a state permitting a
taxpayer to deduct the amount of his indebtedness from the amount
of all bonds, notes and other evidences of debt which he is required
to return for taxation does not render the assessment of national
bank shares at their market value, without allowing the holder to
deduct his indebtedness, an unlawful discrimination against such
shares, and in favor of other moneyed capital.
Another phrase of the question has lately been passed upon in
San Francisco Nat. Bank v. Dodge, 25 Sup. Ct. 384, where the
discrimination grew out of the method of assessing the property.
The statutes of California require that all taxable property shall
be assessed "at its full cash value" and that the terms "value"
and "full cash value" shall be construed to mean the amount at
which the property would be taken in payment of a just debt due
from a solvent debtor. This, it was maintained, required the
assessment of stock at its market value. It was also claimed that
market value was made up of all the property of the banks includ-
ing franchises, the prospective earning capacity, and the skill of the
officers in the management of the company; that an arbitrary
reduction in valuation by the assessor constituted a discrimination,
as in Bank of Cal. v. San Francisco, 142 Cal. 276, where under
statutory provisions the franchise was to be valued by deducting
the value of the tangible property from the market value of the
shares of stock. The discrimination, it was urged, lay in a result-
ing failure to include prospective earning capacity and the skill
of the officers. The court in the principal case was of the opinion
that such reduction was discrimination within the meaning of the
federal statute, as the taxing of the shares of stock of the national
banks at market value included the entire difference between the
value of the tangible property and the selling price of the stock,
as well as the actual value of all tangible property.
The strong dissenting opinion rendered by Justice Brewer and
concurred in by three other justices seems to be more in harmony
with the liberal construction shown by the cases first cited. It
maintains that the value of the stock depends upon that of the
property, that if a fair valuation were placed upon the latter-which
was not denied in this vase-there was no violation of the federal
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statute, and that the court could not inquire into the method of
reasoning by which the assessor had reached the value of the fran-
chise, it being admitted to have been done in good faith. Pol. Code
of Cal., Sec. 3608, it may be remarked, declares that shares of stock
have no intrinsic value over and above the actual value of the
property of the corporation, which they represent.
THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY.
A question of law comparatively new in the American courts,
and one wholly unsettled, is that involving what has been termed
the right of privacy, the right to be let alone. The sentiment in
favor of this right had its first substantial expression in 189o, dur-
ing which year there appeared in Scribner's Magazine for July an,
article entitled "The Rights of the Citizen to his Reputation", by
E. L. Godkin, Esq., an extended discussion on the "Right to
Privacy" in IV Harv. L. R. 193, and the case of Manola v. Stevens
(not reported) in which the Supreme Court of New York enjoined
the defendant from making and issuing photographs surreptitiously
taken of the plaintiff. In Schuyler v. Curtis, 15 N. Y. Supp. 787
(I89I), the relatives of Mrs. George Schuyler, the deceased,
secured an injunction restraining the defendant from proceeding
with a project to make and exhibit a statue of the deceased, the
court holding that the granting of an injunction is not limited to a
case where damages could be recovered at law. In 1895 this case
came before the New York Court of Appeals and the judgment
was reversed on the ground no right of privacy survives so that it
can be enforced by relatives. 147 N. Y. 434. In a case arising in
Michigan where a widow brought an action to restrain the defend-
ant manufacturer from using the name and picture of her deceased
husband on cigar labels, the court held that this was an injury which
the law could not redress. Atkinson v. Doherty, 121 Mich. 373.
So in the United States Circuit Court in a suit brought by the
widow and children of George H. Corliss to enjoin the defendant
publishers from printing and selling the picture of Mr. Corliss, it
was held that the jurisdiction of equity to grant injunctions, being
founded on rights of property, did not extend to a matter affecting
an exclusively personal right. Corliss v. Walker, 64 Fed. 280.
It may be noted that in none of these cases wa the action
brought by the person whose right of privacy had been invaded, but
in the case of Roberson v. Folding Box Co., 71 N. Y. Supp. 876
(19Ol) the action was brought by the person injured and the ques-
tion was squarely presented to the court for decision. In this case it
appeared that lithographed likenesses of a young woman, bearing
the words "Flour of the Family," were, without her consent,
printed and used by a flour milling company to advertise its goods.
The court gave judgment for the plaintiff, holding that if a property
right was necessary to entitle the plaintiff to maintain the action,
the case might stand upon the right of property which every one
has in his own body. This case was carried to the Court of
Appeals in 19o2 and the judgment was reversed. 171 N. Y. 540.
The decision was rendered by a divided court, Judge Gray, with
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whom two associate judges concurred, filing a dissenting opinion.
This decision, finally establishing, as the rule in New York, that.
the right of privacy does not exist, called forth considerable com-
ment in legal publications throughout the country, many of which
approved the conclusions reached in the minority opinion. 36 Am.
Law 634; 12 Yale L. . 35.
In view of the doubtful existence and final defeat of the right
of privacy in New York, and the denial of the right in other juris-
dictions, much interest attaches to the recent case of Pavesich v.
The New England Life Insurance Co., 50 S. E. 68, in which the
Supreme Court of Georgia clearly recognizes that right and grants
relief against the defendant company, which was, without his con-
sent, using the plaintiff's name and picture, to advertise its business.
The court proceeded on the theory that "a right of privacy is
derived from natural law, recognized by municipal law, and its
existence can be inferred from expressions used by commentators
and writers on the law, as well as judges in decided cases," and
that "the right of privacy is embraced within the absolute rights
of personal security and personal liberty."
